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1. Introduction 
The network layer virtual private network programs such as “strongSwan” and “Openswan” 
support both of the IKE and the IKEv2, but many networks still use IKE. 
Unlike IKEv2, DoS(Denial of service) attack may happen in IKE protocol.(Dos attack for the DH 
calculation that happens when a lot of aggressive mode IKE requests having forged source IP 
addresses are received)[1] 
In IKE/IKEv2, Man-in-the-middle attacks to SA payload and KE payload may happen, when 
user uses the electronic certificate distributed as the file format (eg. *p12), the authentication 
function of the user’s certification can be dropped because of the electronic certificate keeping 
problem, so that the reliability of network communication can be decreased.[2,3] 
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2. Composition of the Computer Security USB Key device 
To solve the problems in IKE/IKEv2, Computer Security USB Key device is used. 
The Computer Security USB Key device is composed of CPU, NAND memory, power unit, USB 
connector. 
NAND memory is divided into manager region where user can not read and write, virtual CD 
region where only reading is possible and the user’s region where reading and writing are 
possible. Manager’s region is divided into private key storing region, encrypt algorithm region 
and electronic certificate storing region. 
In private key storing region of the manager’s region the keys(or data that can create key) that 
can be used in security program or encrypt algorithm can be stored and device serial number for 
device uniqueness exists. 
 
3. Improved IKE key exchange protocol combined with the 
Computer Security USB Key device and its Implementation 
IKE 1st phase security negotiation process in aggressive mode is used as an example for 
suggested method. 
 
Initiator(i)                             responder(r) 
HDR, SA, KE, Ni, IDii, *UMi    Æ 
             Å  HDR, SA, KE, Nr, IDir, * UMr, CERT, SIG_R 
HDR, *CERT, SIG_I            Æ 
 
In negotiation process, * means that next payloads are encrypted and UMi and UMr are payloads 
suggested newly in this paper. 
Improved IKE 1st phase security negotiation process is as follows. 
① Before the payload SA, KE, Ni and IDii are transmitted, the initiator should get the device 
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serial number from the Computer Security USB Key device, makes UMi payload with device 
serial number and then  
encrypts it by using encryption key “key1” inside the device (key1 is same for all Computer 
Security USB Key device) to transmit to the responder. 
If initiator can’t get serial number, IKE 1st phase security negotiation process is stopped. 
② The responder recognizes the initiator as the legal user which didn’t  
do DoS attack if encrypted UMi payload is decrypted successfully using encryption key 
“key1” of its Computer Security USB Key device and continues next stage. 
In this stage too, the responder who doesn’t have the Computer Security USB Key device 
can’t take part in negotiation, so that the function of principal's identity authentication is 
raised to protect DoS attack from above two stages. 
③ The responder works as the initiator to make UMr payload, generates signature using 
electronic certification kept in the Computer Security USB Key device of responder and 
encrypts CERT and SIG_R payload reflected electronic certification and signature as an 
encryption key(serial number of its Computer Security USB Key device) respectively to send 
to initiator. (In fact, CERT and SIG_R payload is transmitted as the plain text in aggressive 
mode. It is important to make these payload encrypt in order to raise the identity 
authentication function.) 
④ After the initiator makes sure the responder’s identity by decrypting encrypted UMr , CERT, 
SIG_R payloads, he makes signature by using electronic certification kept on initiator’s 
Computer Security USB Key device and encrypts CERT and SIG_R with electronic 
certification and signature as an encryption key(serial number of its Computer Security USB 
Key device)respectively to send to responder. 
⑤ The responder makes sure the initiator’s identity by decrypting encrypted CERT, SIG_I 
payloads respectively.  
Encrypt algorithm used in improved IKE 1st phase security negotiation process can be done by 
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using encrypt algorithm kept on the Computer Security USB Key device. 
The type of payload(UMi, UMr) including the information of Computer Security USB Key 
device in IPsec(ex, ipsec-tools-0.6.5-9.el5.src.rpm)security program can be defined as follows. 
#define ISAKMP_NPTYPE_DEV    55   /*device information */ 
And the structure of this payload can be defined as follows. 
   typedef struct _devinfo_t_ { 
   unsigned char dev_serial[7]; /* the serial number of USB key device */ 
} devinfo_t; 
 
Result analysis and Conclusion 
The table 1 shows comparison between previous IKE protocol and proposed method in this 
paper.  
Table 1.  Comparison of security performance  
 
Protocol name 
SA, KE 
payload 
protection
CERT, SIG 
payload 
protection 
DoS attack 
prevention 
extensibility 
Certificate   
storage  
IKE 
(IKE 1st phase  
aggressive mode) 
× × × × 
file 
 
Improved IKE 
(IKE 1st phase  
aggressive mode) 
○ ○ ○ IKEv2 
Computer 
Security USB 
Key Device 
Where , ×  indicates no support , ○ indicates support. 
Improved IKE key exchange protocol uses default SA and default KE payload, but 
encryption algorithm and key used in IKE 1st phase security negotiation process are encryption 
algorithm and key kept in computer security USB key device, so that man-in-the-middle attacks 
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to SA payload and KE payload are prevented. 
And DOS attack is prevented by using UMi, UMr payload with device information of user, 
electronic certificate and signature payload are encrypted in computer security USB key device 
and exported, so that reliability for identify authentication is raised.          
The suggested method can be also applied in IKE v2 protocol. 
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